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On March 7, 2014, the International Criminal Court delivered its most recent judgment 
convicting Mr. Katanga as an accessory of crime against humanity in the form of murder 
and four counts of war crimes within the meaning of Art. 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute. 
This decision along with its previous final decisions in the Lubanga and Ngudjolo cases 
has raised similar concerns about individual criminal responsibility regarding, inter alia, 
application of control over a crime doctrine as evidenced from the dissenting / separate 
opinions to them. This doctrine has already firmly settled within the ICC jurisprudence 
and yet some judges doubt if its application is justified, especially given the peculiarities 
of national origin irrelevant in the realm of the Rome Statute. The other raised concern 
is a potential application of the legality principle, since both Ngudjolo and Katanga 
judgments have investigated the same situations and come to the completely different 
results.
While the Rome Statute contains the most complete provision determining the modes 
of individual responsibility, Art. 25 thus appears to be far from being out of debates. To 
dispel some of them, this article analyzes practical application of Art. 25(3)(a) and (d) 
by the ICC and different approaches in this regard as well as general grounds for raising 
question on the necessity for individual criminal responsibility.
Keywords: ICC; individual criminal responsibility; Rome Statute; control over a crime; 
blameworthiness.
doI: 10.17589/2309-8678-2015-3-1-143-168
RUSSIAN LAW JOURNAL    Volume III (2015) Issue 1 144
1. Introduction
2012 has become a new landmark in international criminal law [hereinafter ICL].1 
the International Criminal Court [hereinafter ICC, Court] delivered its first judgment 
convicting Mr. Lubanga of commission of war crimes under the rome statute.2 
unsurprisingly, the basic concept of individual criminal responsibility was the main 
contentious issue raised before the Court, as follows from the separate opinion of 
Judge Fulford.3 Further ICC practice proves the ambiguity of this issue in its later 
judgments defining the mode of individual criminal responsibility for Mr. katanga 
and Mr. Ngudjolo in 2013 and 2014 respectively. Both of them also contain dissenting 
opinions addressing the similar problems.
the issues raised in respect of international criminal responsibility have their roots 
in the history of the ICL. Being an actively developing separate branch of international 
law, the modern ICL has been evolving only for 70 years since the Nuremberg and 
tokyo International Military tribunals. despite the promising begining, the real dawn 
in ICL occurred in 1990s with establishment of the international criminal tribunals 
ad hoc and later final setting up of the permanent court in 2002. only then was the 
ICL finally crystallized as a branch of the contemporary international law.
Nevertheless, doubts remain whether ICL is a branch of law without any flaws. 
state practice as well as jurisprudence of international judicial bodies are still filling up 
the gaps and develop the early established concepts including general principles.
the following article elaborates on the genesis and further development of 
the principle of individual criminal responsibility. the first part provides with an 
understanding of the principle’s roots and explains its status and content, while the 
second one provides an analysis of the ICC practice in the context of application 
of Art. 25 titled ‘Individual Criminal responsibility.’ this article is pertinent, since 
today the rome statute’s provisions contain not only merely the most exhaustive 
list of forms of individual criminal responsibility for commission of international 
crimes but also summarize the already existing approaches to understanding of 
this principle.
1  thomas r. Liefänder, The Lubanga Judgment of the ICC: More Than Just the First Step?, 1(1) Cambridge 
J. Int’l & Comp. L. 191 (2012). doi:10.7574/cjicl.01.01.38
2  situation in the democratic republic of the Congo (the Prosecutor v. thomas Lubanga dyilo) ¶ 1358, 
No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (Intl. Crim. Ct., tr. Chamber I, Mar. 14, 2012), available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Lubanga, tr. Chamber I].
3  situation in the democratic republic of the Congo (the Prosecutor v. thomas Lubanga dyilo) ¶ 1, 3, 
No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (Intl. Crim. Ct., tr. Chamber I, Mar. 14, 2012) (separate opinion of Judge Adrian 
Fulford) [hereinafter Fulford].
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2. Individual Criminal Responsibility as a General Principle  
of International Criminal Law
Contemporary international law as a stem for the ICL originated as a system of 
prohibitions and authorizations specifically designed for and dedicated to players 
on the international stage. Previously only sovereign states were fully recognized 
as players.4 state sovereignty was and still remains one of the cornerstones of 
international law, which was defined by the Permanent Court of International Justice 
in famous Lotus as a freedom of states to act in any manner that is not directly 
prohibited.5
the classic concept of international law did not recognize other actors as possessors 
of rights and obligations.6 In particular, at times international organizations were not 
treated as separate subjects of international law until in 1949 the ICJ finally solved 
the disputes in this regard in Reparation for injuries.7
Parallel to these changes, an active development of international relations as 
well as numerous wars in the 20 century, leading to disastrous consequences, have 
raised one of the most important questions in the history of mankind: who is guilty 
and responsible for the commission of war atrocities and crimes against humanity? 
the international community has come forth with different possible answers: states, 
entities, corporates and individuals.
As it is evident, the classic concept of international law suggests only one answer 
to this question: state solely may bear the responsibility. however, this approach 
could not solve all existing disputes and provide effective means of preventing similar 
situations in the future. the following reasons give a basis for further research.
Above all, to convict the society as a whole or state for committing separate, now 
criminally punishable actions under international law, ‘seem[s] to be too abstract and 
would have proved to be unproductive.’8 In other words, if everybody is guilty, then 
nobody is, especially considering this aspect as applicable not to a small collective, 
but to the whole state with multimillion population. taking this into account, the 
issue regarding identification of persons responsible for war crimes and crimes 
4  Lassa oppenheim, 1 International Law: A treatise 107 (2nd ed., Longmanns, green & Co. 1912), available 
at <https://archive.org/details/internationalla03oppegoog> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015); kay hailbronner 
& Martin kau, Der Staat und der Einzelne als Völkerrechtsubjekte, in Völkerrecht 156 (wolfgang g. 
Vitzthum. ed.) (5th ed., de gruyter 2010).
5  Case of the s.s. ‘Lotus’ (Fr. v. turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 18–19 (sep. 7), available at <http://www.
icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_A/A_10/30_Lotus_Arret.pdf> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015).
6  Malcolm N. shaw, International Law 197 (6th ed., Cambridge university Press 2008).
7  Advisory opinion, reparation for Injuries suffered in the service of the united Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 
174, at 179 (Apr. 11).
8  Vincenzo Militello, The Personal Nature of Criminal Responsibility and ICC Statute, 5(4) J. Int’l Crim. Justice 
944 (2007). doi:10.1093/jicj/mqm039
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against humanity cannot be avoided. the mere statement of fact that the crime has 
been committed without reference to people who have actually done it automatically 
shifts the responsibility from a person to the whole collective.9
By individualization of responsibility for the most serious crimes in the field of 
ICL one can reach more than enforcement of international law (that, as such, is not 
a goal itself ). Individualization of responsibility can significantly facilitate the process 
of reconciliation in the society.10 holding some persons responsible ‘opens possibility 
to [re-thinking] of the conflict itself’ which has led to such consequences.11
Moreover, as a matter of fact the state / society responsibility in such cases does 
not correspond to the reality to a full extent. here it is important to note that the issue 
at hand does not concern the formal legal attribution of war actions, which according 
to the International Law Commission’s draft Articles on states responsibility might 
be considered as state actions.12 rather, the main issue here is to what the Nuremberg 
International Military tribunal drew attention: ‘Crimes against international law are 
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals 
who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.’13 
International community has thus strongly inclined towards individualization of 
responsibility since then, as is further clearly evidenced in the Prosecutor’s opening 
statement in the Milošević case focusing on the same issue.14
the same reasons likewise laid the foundation for denial of the French proposal 
to expand the rome statute’s provisions on individual criminal responsibility 
for ‘juridical’ persons.15 Apart from abovementioned considerations, inclusion of 
corporate liability would generate superfluous complications. For instance, it would 
lead to the necessity of further negotiations on the exact wording of the clause 
9  dennis Nitsche, der Internationale strafgerichtshof ICC und der Frieden: Eine vergleichende Analyse 
der Befriedungsfunktion internationaler straftribunale 169 (Nomos 2007).
10  Nitsche, supra n. 9, at 170.
11  Id. at 170.
12  Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in report of the International 
Law Commission, u.N. gAor, 53rd sess., supp. No. 10, u.N. doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in 2 y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 20 (2001), u.N. doc. A/CN.4/sEr.A/2001/Add.1, at <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015).
13  International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgement and Sentences (Oct. 1, 1946), 41 Am. J. Int’l L. 
172, 220–221 (1947).
14  The Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Prosecution opening statement ¶ 4, No. It-02-54-t (Intl. Crim. 
trib. for the Former yugo., Feb. 12, 2002).
15  u.N. diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court (rome, 15 June – 17 July 1998), 2 official records: summary records of the Plenary Meetings 
and of the Meetings of the Committee of the whole at 133, u.N. doc. A/CoNF/183/13 (Vol. II), u.N. sales 
No. E.02.I.5 (Art. 23 ‘Individual Criminal responsibility,’ proposal submitted by France (A/CoNF.183/
C.1/L.3)), available at <http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.
pdf> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015).
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especially given the fact that such a provision does not exist in the most legal 
systems, as well as to increase the amount of required evidence.16
despite all these considerations, there is still a strong contrary approach. under 
the system criminality concept only collective entities like state or organized groups 
are in fact able to commit or encourage the commission of international crimes.17 
opposed to what the Nuremberg tribunal underlined, the International Military 
tribunal for the Far East’s Judge B. röling has rightly pointed out that war crimes’ 
commission had always served the purposes of system and had been caused by the 
system.18 yet, this concept is more suitable for general understanding of causes rather 
than as a practical guideline for criminal prosecution of guilty persons.
thus, as a logical corollary of these thoughts international society has swiftly 
come to understand the necessity to invoke individual criminal responsibility for the 
most serious international crimes, which has become one of the main ICL principles. 
this basic idea has been reflected in plenty of sources: statutes of Nuremberg and 
tokyo International Military tribunals;19 recent statutes of the International Criminal 
tribunal for the Former yugoslavia20 and International Criminal tribunal for rwanda,21 
the rome statute.22 the main principles recognized by the statute of the Nuremberg 
tribunal were also upheld by the uN general Assembly in 1946.23
16  ole k. Fauchald & Jo stigen, Corporate Responsibility before International Institutions, 40 geo. wash. Int’l 
L. rev. 1026, 1038–39 (2009), available at <http://www.jus.uio.no/ior/personer/vit/olefa/dokumenter/
corporate-resp.pdf> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015).
17  system Criminality in International Law 15 (harmen van der wilt & André Nollkaemper, eds.) 
(Cambridge university Press 2009).
18  Bert V.A. röling, The Significance of the Laws of War, in Current Problems of International Law: Essays 
on uN Law and on the Law of Armed Conflict 46 (Antonio Cassese, ed.) (giuffrè 1975).
19  Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major war Criminals of the European Axis, Charter 
of the International Military tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, Art. 6, 82 u.N.t.s. 279, 284, at <http://www.refworld.
org/docid/47fdfb34d.html> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015); Charter of the International Military tribunal 
for the Far East, Apr. 26, 1946, Art. 5, t.I.A.s. No. 1589, at <http://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/
bevans/m-ust000004-0020.pdf> (accesed Mar. 12, 2015).
20  statute of the International tribunal for the Former yugoslavia, Art. 7 (adopted by u.N. security Council 
res. 808 (1993), u.N. doc. s/rEs/808 (February 22, 1993)), at <http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20
Library/statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015).
21  statute of the International tribunal for rwanda, Art. 6, u.N. security Council res. 955 (1994), u.N.doc. 
s/rEs/955 (November 8, 1994), <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/peace/docs/scres955.html> 
(accessed Mar. 12, 2015).
22  rome statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, Art. 25(3), 2187 u.N.t.s. 3, at <http://
www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf> 
(accessed Mar. 12, 2015).
23  Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
g.A. res. 95 (I), u.N. gAor, 1st sess., pt. 2, at 1144, u.N. doc. A/236 (1946), at <http://www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/instree/1946a.htm> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015).
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Consequently, international law stepped away from the initial understanding of 
liability for its violations through individual criminal responsibility. As regards the 
rome statute itself, the enumeration of individual criminal responsibility therein 
was not an innovative provision.24 yet, Art. 25 of the rome statute as such, being 
a list of individual criminal responsibility principles as well as its application by the 
ICC represents to date the most important and topical source for analysis in order to 
deduce not only already existent approaches to determination of individual criminal 
responsibility, but also for understanding the developing tendencies in this regard. 
the relevance of Art. 25 is predetermined by both the permanent character of the ICC 
activity, that celebrated the tenth anniversary in 2012, and the fact that the activity 
of international criminal tribunals ad hoc comes to an end soon.
3. Individual Criminal Responsibility on Art. 25  
of the Rome Statute
Article 25(3) of the rome statute addresses the issues concerning individual 
criminal responsibility. the article lists six forms of individual criminal responsibility.25 
In some authors’ opinions, this article represents the most exhaustive list of such 
forms to date.26 despite this, some basic issues still seem to be ambiguous. Inter alia, 
no consensus exists, whether the structure of Art. 25 indicates a hierarchy between 
24  Militello, supra n. 8, at 944.
25  rome statute, supra n. 22, Art. 25(3), the text follows as:
‘3. In accordance with this statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment 
for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, 
regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;
b) orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occures or is attempted;
c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its 
commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission;
d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group 
of persons acting with a common purpose. such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where 
such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;
e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide;
f ) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of 
a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person’s 
intentions. however, a person who abandonds the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents 
the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this statute for the attempt to 
commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.’
26  Attila Bogdan, Individual Criminal Responsibility in the Execution of a ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise’ in the 
Jurisprudence of the ad hoc International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6(1) Int’l Crim. L. rev. 67 
(2006). doi:10.1163/157181206777066727
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different forms of individual criminal responsibility and whether they are exclusive.27 
the amplified practice of international criminal tribunals ad hoc opines that ‘the various 
modes of liability available under their statutes are not mutually exclusive,’28 while the 
ICC took a different approach, as might implicitly follow from its first judgment.29
As to the other details unclear from the provision’s wording itself, the ICC practice 
specifies and elaborates on additional objective and subjective elements of each 
abovementioned form to apply provisions of the rome statute on a case-by-case basis.
to date the ICC Chambers considered a few grounds for individual criminal 
responsibility reflected in Art. 25(3)(a) and (d), while other sections remained 
untouched. As to the Art. 25(3)(a), and namely bringing to responsibility for 
commission of a crime through another person, the ICC has considered this form 
of liability in the decisions on confirmation of charges in five cases: Lubanga, Katanga 
and Ngudjolo, Ruto, Bemba and Muthaura.
In respect of the Art. 25(3)(d) the Pre-trial Chamber I has analyzed this form of 
individual criminal responsibility when it decided to decline confirmation of the 
charges in Mbarushimana as well as in the final judgment in the most recent Katanga 
case. these conclusions were also upheld by Pre-trial Chamber II in the decision on 
confirmation of charges in Ruto.
Besides, the issue of basing individual criminal responsibility on the grounds of 
other subsections of Art. 25 has been raised in the arrest warrants issued in Kony, 
Harun (Art. 25(3)(b)) and Barasa (Art. 25(3)(f )). given the absence of decisions in 
these cases on confirmation of charges or on its declining the detailed additional 
criteria of abovementioned forms of individual criminal responsibility have not been 
formulated yet.
hence, the ICC has sufficiently considered only two forms of a person with 
responsibility. they will be analyzed below separately.
3.1. Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute in the Practice of the ICC
Pursuant to Art. 25(3)(a) a person is liable if he or she commits a crime 1) individually; 
2) ‘jointly with another’ person; 3) ‘through another person, regardless of whether that 
other person is criminally responsible.’  the Chambers paid the most attention to the 
third described provision, while the joint responsibility was analyzed only in part and 
individual commission of crime was not scrutinized whatsoever.
27  Fulford, supra n. 3, ¶¶ 7–8.
28  Id. fn. 13; The Prosecutor v. Vlastimir Đorđević, Judgment ¶¶ 2193–94, No. It-05-87-1-t (Intl. Crim. 
trib. for the Former yugo., tr. Chamber II, Feb. 23, 2011), available at <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
djordjevic/tjug/en/110223_djordjevic_judgt_en.pdf> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015); The Prosecutor v. 
Ferdinand Nahimana et al., Judgment ¶ 483, No. ICtr-99-52-A (Intl. Crim. trib. for the Former yugo., 
App. Chamber, Nov. 28, 2007), available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/48b5271d2.html> 
(accessed Mar. 12, 2015).
29  Lubanga, tr. Chamber I, supra n. 2, ¶ 999.
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3.1.1. Commission of a Crime Jointly with Another Person
the Pre-trial Chamber II has partly considered the issue of charging a person 
with individual criminal responsibility jointly with another person in the decision on 
confirmation of charges in the Ruto case. Although the Chamber did not analyze the 
facts of the case in this regard due to the Prosecution’s ‘inconsistent labeling of criminal 
responsibility of the suspects’30 within its submission to charge them with responsibility 
simultaneously ‘jointly’ and ‘through’ another person omitting connective ‘or’31 referred 
to in Art. 25(3)(a),32 the ICC confirmed the decision of Pre-trial Chamber I in Bemba33 
regarding the ‘notion of control over the crime.’ 34 therefore it concluded that this form 
of responsibility requires as a necessary element a suspect’s control over a crime.35
the control over a crime doctrine, originating from the german national system,36 
is one of the possible legal ways to determine co-perpetrators of a crime. to put it in 
the words of Pre-trial Chamber I in Lubanga ‘a person can become a co-perpetrator of 
a crime only if he or she has “joint control” over the crime as a result of the “essential 
contribution” ascribed to him or her.’37 Contrary to other theories, this doctrine still 
requires ‘essential contribution’ for co-perpetration and yet allows charging with 
criminal responsibility as co-perpetrators also those who were not present at the 
field of crime and especially so called masterminds of a crime.38
despite the Court’s general inclination towards this concept, also reflected in 
the recent judgments in the Lubanga,39 Ngudjolo40 and Katanga41 cases, the ICC is not 
30  situation in the republic of kenya (the Prosecutor v. william samoei ruto et al.) ¶ 283, No. ICC-01/09-
01/11 (Intl. Crim. Ct., Pre-tr. Chamber II, Jan. 23, 2012), available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc1314535.pdf> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015).
31  Id. ¶ 287.
32  Id. ¶ 284.
33  Id. ¶ 291.
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  Fulford, supra n. 3, ¶ 10.
37  Lubanga, tr. Chamber I, supra n. 2, ¶ 322.
38  situation in the democratic republic of the Congo (the Prosecutor v. germain katanga) ¶ 281, No. ICC-
01/04-01/07 (Intl. Crim. Ct., tr. Chamber II, Mar. 7, 2014) (minority opinion of Judge Christine Van den 
wyngaert), available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1744372.pdf> (accessed Mar. 12, 
2015) [hereinafter wyngaert, katanga].
39  Lubanga, tr. Chamber I, supra n. 2, ¶ 920.
40  situation in the democratic republic of the Congo (the Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo) ¶¶ 473, 484–
486, No. ICC-01/04-02/12 (Intl. Crim. Ct., tr. Chamber II, dec. 18, 2012), available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1579080.pdf> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015).
41  summary of trial Chamber II’s Judgment of 7 March 2014, Pursuant to Article 74 of the statute in the 
Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, <http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20
media/press%20releases/documents/986/14_0259_ENg_summary_judgment.pdf> (accessed Mar. 12, 
2015) [hereinafter katanga, summary].
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unanimous in this respect. For instance, Judge Fulford in his separate opinion to 
Lubanga has strongly criticized application of the control over the crime doctrine.42 
As he points out, being a national german theory ‘of “functional control over the act” 
(„funktionelle tatherrschaft“)’43 this one may consequently include national peculiarities 
which are necessary for taking into account for the doctrine to be applied.44
Apart from a lack of such peculiarities within the realm of the rome statute, 
only a few ad hoc tribunals share the ICC’s view, for example Stakić45 and the Judge 
schomburg’s separate opinion in Gacumbitsi.46 Moreover, in its practice of applying 
‘general principles of law derived from national legal systems’ the ICC should 
pay attention to their compatibility with rome statute general framework and 
applicability of such states’ policy by the ICC, which is not completely followed with 
respect to the ‘control over the crime’ doctrine, in Judge Fulford’s opinion.47
In this particular instance, the problem lies in the disputable necessity of the 
theory’s application. unlike the german national law which distinguishes sentencing 
between principals and accessories,48 the rome statute does not explicitly provide 
comparable different treatment of those accused under different subsections of Art. 25. 
As a consequence this distinction raises reasonable doubts about its necessity that 
only partially might be dispelled by implied motives of reconciliation and labeling 
‘masterminds’ of crime.49
this has been one of the main concerns of Judge Van den wyngaert who in two 
separate opinions (Ngudjolo’s confirmation of charges and Katanga’s judgment) 
raised an issue of blameworthiness, supporting Judge Fulford.50 According to them, 
the rome statute does not explicitly contain differentiation in sentencing depending 
on what section person is accused. Nevertheless, the next considerations allow 
42  Fulford, supra n. 3, ¶¶ 6, 10–11.
43  kai Ambos, Article 25. Individual Criminal Responsibility, in Commentary on the rome statute of the 
International Criminal Court 752 (otto triffteter, ed.) (2nd ed., Beck; hart; Nomos 2008).
44  Fulford, supra n. 3, ¶ 10.
45  The Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Judgment ¶ 62, No. It-97-24-A (Intl. Crim. trib. for the Former yugo., 
App. Chamber, Mar. 22, 2006), available at <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/acjug/en/sta-aj 
060322e.pdf> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015).
46  The Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, Judgment ¶ 17, No. ICtr-2001-64-A (Intl. Crim. trib. rwanda, 
App. Chamber, Jul. 7, 2006) (separate opinion of Judge schomburg), available at <http://www.unictr.
org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-01-64/appeals-chamber-judgements/en/060707.pdf> 
(accessed Mar. 12, 2015).
47  Fulford, supra n. 3, ¶ 10.
48  Id. ¶ 11.
49  Jens d. ohlin et al., Assessing the Control-Theory, 26(3) Leiden J. Int’l L. 745 (2013). doi:dx.doi.
org/10.1017/s0922156513000319
50  situation in the democratic republic of the Congo (the Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo) ¶¶ 22–24, 
No. ICC-01/04-02/12 (Intl. Crim. Ct., tr. Chamber II, dec. 12, 2012) (concurring opinion of Judge 
Christine Van den wyngaert); wyngaert, katanga, supra n. 38, ¶ 281.
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avoiding this tricky issue with blameworthiness and thus lack necessity of the control 
over a crime doctrine’s application.
First of all, it must be conceded that the rome statute does not indeed contain 
explicit provisions which say that Art. 25(3) includes various range for sentences 
formally depending on its applicable subsection in the case.51 so, the only basis for 
difference in sentencing is how a judge comprehends the situation and the role of 
accused therein. As a matter of fact the perception of the role in crime is not the 
same for different activities. Contribution of a person deciding to pull a trigger will 
always be different from that of who merely gave the gun to him.
In other words, it appears even in the absence of certain provisions in the rome 
statute in this respect, the situation will still implicitly distinguish the contribution 
of persons and consequently their danger for international society. therefore the 
problem with lack of blameworthiness can be avoided merely by interpretation of 
the rome statute as implicitly containing the different understanding of the role 
that accused has played on case by case basis. hence, the control over a crime may 
be applicable to the proceedings before the ICC even in the absence of provisions 
in the rome statute on differentiation of sentences.
Based on the above, the form of responsibility Jointly with another person does 
cause controversies and, therefore, has room for progress, as specified by Judge 
Fulford. Indeed, a german theory ‘control over a crime’ predominantly applied by 
the Court does not seem to be completely and formally pertinent under the rome 
statute due to the worldwide character of the ICC. however, at least two points 
suggest that the application of the doctrine is not as problematic as it might appear 
at first sight. First, the dispute over its applicability (at least, for Lubanga) is rather 
theoretical, since as Judge Fulford admitted itself the outcome of the judgment still 
should be the same.52 second, nevertheless the raised problem may be crucial for 
one of the next cases and, thus, requires to be solved. the proposed understanding 
of Art. 25 as always having case by case basis might avoid part of this criticism.
3.1.2. Commission of a Crime Through Another Person
the third form of conduct leading to individual criminal responsibility under 
Art. 25(3)(a) through another person has been actively developed by the ICC. By 
application of this provision of the rome statute the respective Pre-trial Chambers 
have concluded that this form of responsibility demands proof of objective and 
subjective elements of a crime commission.53
51  ohlin et al., supra n. 49, at 745–746.
52  Fulford, supra n. 3, ¶¶ 19–21.
53  situation in democratic republic of the Congo (the Prosecutor v. thomas Lubanga dyilo) ¶¶ 343–349, 
No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (Intl. Crim. Ct., Pre-tr. Chamber I, Jan. 29, 2007), available at <http://www.icc-cpi.
int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PdF> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Lubanga, Pre-tr. Chamber I].
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In this regard it is necessary to consider the ICC’s position concerning the Joint 
Criminal Enterprise [hereinafter JCE] doctrine, widely used by the International 
Criminal tribunal for the Former yugoslavia jurisprudence, starting from the well-
known Tadić.54 this theory was recognized as inapplicable by the ICC due to the 
difference in functioning of tribunals ad hoc and the permanent Court. For instance, 
in the Lubanga case the Pre-trial Chamber I decided that the rome statute not only 
contains detailed written forms of responsibility for participation in commission of 
international crimes, but also ‘avoids the broader definitions’ similar to the provisions 
of the statute of International Criminal tribunal for the former yugoslavia.55 Instead of 
the JCE doctrine the ICC preferred the control over the crime one.56 From the point of 
Chamber’s view, the JCE doctrine focuses mainly on the ‘commission of the offence 
as the distinguishing criterion between principals and accessories’ on the basis of 
their state of mind in comparison with the level of ‘contribution to the commission 
of such offence,’ supported by the ICC.57 In comparison with the JCE doctrine, the 
joint control over the crime one recognizes as principals not only individuals having 
physically performed objective elements of the crimes’ commission, but also those 
who decided whether and in which way such crime would be committed.58
the Pre-trial Chamber I’s decision on confirmation of charges in Lubanga the 
first time defines the determination of objective elements of charging individual 
criminal responsibility through another person: existence of 1) common plan59 and 
2) ‘essential contribution to commission of a crime for establishment a fact of 
common control over the crime.’60
subsequently the ICC clarified the objective elements in Katanga, Mbarushimana, 
Ruto and Muthaura as follows: 1) existence of agreement or common plan on 
commission of international crimes between two and more persons;61 2) existence of 
‘essential contribution of each of them to commission of such crimes in the coordinated 
manner, which, in turn, is proved by fulfillment of subjective elements of the respective 
54  The Prosecutor v. Du[ko Tadi] a/k/a/ ‘Dule,’ opinion and Judgment ¶¶ 191–192, No. It-94-1-t (Intl. Crim. 
trib. for the Former yugo., tr. Chamber, May 7, 1997), available at <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/
tjug/en/tad-tsj70507Jt2-e.pdf> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015).
55  Lubanga, Pre-tr. Chamber I, supra n. 53, ¶¶ 323, 338.
56  Id. ¶¶ 330–335.
57  Id. ¶ 329.
58 Id. ¶ 330.
59  Id. ¶ 343.
60  Id. ¶ 346.
61  Id. ¶¶ 343–345; situation in the democratic republic of the Congo (Prosecutor v. germain katanga & 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui) ¶¶ 522–523, No. ICC-01/04-01/07-717 (Intl. Crim. Ct., Pre-tr. Chamber I, sep. 30, 
2008), available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015) 
[hereinafter katanga & Ngudjolo, Pre-tr. Chamber I].
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crimes;’62 3) ‘control over an organization;’63 4) existence of hierarchy and separation 
of authorities inside the organization;64 and 5) providing the commission of crimes by 
inferiors on the leader’s order.65 three last objective elements elaborated by the Pre-trial 
Chamber(s) must be proven by automatic execution of orders given by the suspect, as 
it was described in the decision on confirmation of charges in the Ruto case.66
Proving an existence of ‘agreement of common plan,’ the ICC follows the 
next approach: execution of such a plan which has a risk of international crime 
commission should be performed together with the criminal purpose exclusively 
prescribing commission of a crime. Co-perpetrators should be aware of the purpose 
combined with this risk and agree on the execution of common plan67 by acting in 
cooperation.68 Article 25(3)(a) is not applicable, if participation of a single person is 
not coordinated with other co-perpetrators in the commission of crimes.69 Common 
plan or agreement does not necessarily need to be explicit. their existence is implied 
in the framework of coordinated joint actions of indirect co-perpetrators inferred 
from the concerted actions of the indirect co-perpetrators.70
the element of ‘essential contribution to the commission of a crime’ is fulfilled, 
when persons act under the common plan in accordance with their tasks which are 
crucial for execution of this plan.71 Failure to perform these tasks can put under the 
threat the commission of a crime by all co-perpetrators.72 Essentiality of a contribution 
can include a special trigger mechanism leading to the automatic execution of orders 
directed to the commission of international crimes.73
Another objective element, control over an organization is generally interpreted 
as control of one person over another due to existence of hierarchical structure and 
its functioning. Accordingly, inferiors would execute the leaders’ orders leading to the 
criminal result. A leader’s order implies its automatic execution by inferiors because 
of absolute control of leader over actions of inferior.74
62  ruto et al., supra n. 30, ¶ 292.
63  katanga & Ngudjolo, Pre-tr. Chamber I, supra n. 61, ¶¶ 500–510.
64  Id. ¶¶ 511–514.
65  Id. ¶¶ 515–518.
66  ruto et al., supra n. 30, ¶ 313.
67  Lubanga, Pre-tr. Chamber I, supra n. 53, ¶ 344.
68  Id. ¶ 345.
69 Id. ¶ 343.
70  ruto et al., supra n. 30, ¶ 301.
71  Lubanga, Pre-tr. Chamber I, supra n. 53, ¶ 347.
72  Id. 
73  ruto et al., supra n. 30, ¶ 306.
74  katanga & Ngudjolo, Pre-tr. Chamber I, supra n. 61, ¶ 515.
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with a purpose to establish subjective elements, being necessary for charging 
individual criminal responsibility, primarily applied Art. 30 of rome statute states that 
a person should act ‘with intent and knowledge.’75 however, the Pre-trial Chamber I 
in its decision on confirmation of charges in Lubanga noted that in this context 
subjective element means: 1) satisfaction of general subjective elements of crimes 
under Art. 30 of the rome statute; 2) joint awareness that results in implementation 
of the common plan shall constitute fulfillment of the material elements of the 
crimes; and 3) awareness of circumstances enabling the person to exercise control 
over the commission of the crime through another person.76 these criteria found 
their confirmation in decision on confirmation of charges in the Ruto case.77
the first element was construed as ‘intent’ in the decision on confirmation of 
charges in Bemba.78 there for the first time in the ICC practice it emphasized the 
importance of subjective elements when it comes to the commission of crimes 
through another person.79
the second element purports the co-penetrators’ awareness that implementation 
of common plan will lead to the commission of crime satisfying all objective elements 
necessary for its establishment. however, despite the awareness co-perpetrators 
continued performing actions leading to the commission of such a crime.80
the third element was interpreted by the ICC as awareness of the essential role 
of the person in the commission of the crime. In this regard level of role ‘essentiality’ 
means that failure of this person to perform his task puts under risk the commission 
of the whole collective crime.81
In sum, Art. 25(3)(a) has successfully gone through its first scrutiny by the ICC. 
having been created in Lubanga and developed in Catanga and Mbarushimana, 
additional objective and subjective criteria were fully confirmed in recent Ruto and 
Muthaura. their practical application resulted in thomas Lubanga dyilo’s sentencing 
to 14 years of imprisonment.
Besides, as a striking tendency one may indicate the Court’s refusal to apply the 
widely used by the ad hoc tribunals JCE doctrine. Instead, the ICC prefers the control over 
a crime which application is rather justified. Although there are not so far deviations, 
the ICC’s inclination to this concept has to be further confirmed in the future.
75  rome statute, supra n. 22, Art. 30(2), (3).
76  Lubanga, Pre-tr. Chamber I, supra n. 53, ¶¶ 349–367.
77  ruto et al., supra n. 30, ¶ 333.
78  situation in the Central African republic (the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba gombo) ¶ 369, No. ICC-
01/05-01/08 (Intl. Crim. Ct., Pre-tr. Chamber II, Jun. 15, 2009), available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc699541.pdf> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015).
79  Id. 
80  Id. ¶ 370; Lubanga, Pre-tr. Chamber I, supra n. 53, ¶ 352.
81  Lubanga, Pre-tr. Chamber I, supra n. 53, ¶ 347.
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3.2. The Practice of Interpretation and Application of Art. 25(3)(d) of the Rome 
Statute
Article 25(3)(d) deals with contributions ‘in any other way.’ It was included with the 
purpose to the person with individual criminal responsibility in situations not falling 
under Art. 25(3)(a)–(c). thus, it may be marked as the most restricted expansion to 
contribution to international crimes’ commission.82
turning back to the drafting history, Art. 25(3)(d) represents a compromise 
with early similar provisions being controversial since the Nuremberg trial.83 For 
instance, so-called ‘conspiracy provisions’ were already reflected in the draft Code 
of Crimes against the Peace and security of Mankind (1991) as participation of 
an individual in ‘common plan for the commission of a crime against the peace 
and security of mankind.’84 the later edition of the draft Code (1996) includes an 
individual’s ‘direct participation in planning or conspiring to commit such a crime 
which in fact occurs,’85 restricting the abovementioned responsibility to a ‘direct 
participation and an effective commission of the crime.’86 In comparison with the 
previous considerations, the rome statute reflects this more restrictive approach, 
requiring at least a ‘contribution to a collective attempt of a crime.’87
For the time being the Court has applied Art. 25(3)(d) only in a few decisions. under 
this form of responsibility it issued a judgment in the Katanga case,88 declined the 
charges in Mbarushimana.89 Also, the ICC confirmed the similar conclusions in Ruto.90
the facts of Mbarushimana are relevant for the understanding of this provision. the 
reasoning of the Court was based, inter alia, on interpretation of the Mbarushimana’s 
82  kai Ambos, General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome Statute, 10 Crim. L. Forum 1, 12 (1999), 
available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1972243> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015) [hereinafter 
Ambos, General Principles].
83  Id. at 12.
84  Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in report of the International Law 
Commission, u.N. gAor, 46th sess., supp. No. 10, u.N. doc. A/46/10 (1991), reprinted in 2(2) y.B. 
Int’l L. Comm’n 99 (1991), u.N. doc. A/CN.4/sEr.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 2), at <http://legal.un.org/ilc/
documentation/english/A_46_10.pdf> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015).
85  Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in report of the International Law 
Commission, u.N. gAor, 51th sess., supp. No. 10, u.N. doc. A/51/10 (1996), reprinted in 2(2) y.B. Int’l 
L. Comm’n 18 (1996), u.N. doc. A/CN.4/sEr.A/1996/Add.1 (Part 2), at <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/
instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_4_1996.pdf> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015).
86  Ambos, General Principles, supra n. 82, at 13.
87  Id. 
88  katanga, summary, supra n. 41.
89  situation in democratic republic of the Congo (the Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana) ¶ 269, 
No. ICC-01/04-01/10 (Intl. Crim. Ct., Pre-tr. Chamber I, dec. 16, 2011), available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1286409.pdf> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015).
90  ruto et al., supra n. 30, ¶ 351.
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press releases in his capacity of Executive secretary of Forces Démocratiques pour la 
Libération du Rwanda [hereinafter FdLr] and his role in the corresponding media 
campaign as a part of this organization’s agenda, which is not exclusively aimed at 
the commission of international crimes. the ICC similarly took into consideration 
the Mbarushimana’s participation in the saint Egidio peace process between the 
government of the Congo and the FdLr91 as a spokesperson92 for the purposes 
of peace negotiations. hence, although Mbarushimana had actively participated 
in the activities of the FdLr, still the criterion of substantial contribution, which 
would be analyzed further, has not been fulfilled. It indicates the relatively high 
threshold of Art. 25(3)(d). It is worth mentioning that despite different results for 
primarily accused in Mbarushimana decision and recent Katanga judgment the 
following objective and subjective criteria were confirmed and fully applied by the 
trial Chamber II in Katanga.
As regards the objective elements, they include: 1) commission or attempted 
commission of a crime within the ICC jurisdiction;93 2) commission of such crime by 
‘group of persons acting with a common purpose;’94 3) contribution of a person to 
the commission of a crime differs from one needed for Art. 25(3)(a)–(c).95 the JCE 
doctrine was also recognized as inapplicable due to its lower threshold for bringing 
to responsibility in comparison with Art. 25(3)(d) requirements.96 the differences 
between the applied concept and the JCE doctrine include 1) whether a ‘defendant 
found guilty is convicted as principal or accessory;’ 2) whether he ‘must be in the 
group acting with the common purpose’ or not; 3) whether his contribution amounts 
to the common purpose or international crimes’ commission; and 4) whether some 
form of ‘intent or mere knowledge is sufficient for bringing to responsibility.’97
within the context of the second objective element, the Pre-trial Chamber I 
confirmed its definition of ‘the group of persons acting with a common purpose’ 
given in Lubanga within the context of ‘existence of agreement or common plan 
for commission of crimes between two or more persons.’98 such an agreement or 
common plan should ‘necessarily include the element of criminality but does not 
need to be specifically directed at the commission of a crime.’99
91  Mbarushimana, supra n. 89, ¶ 318.
92  Id. ¶ 319.
93 Id. ¶ 270.
94  Id. ¶ 271.
95  Id. ¶ 276.
96  Id. ¶ 273.
97  Id. ¶ 282.
98  Id. ¶ 271.
99  Id. 
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Interpretation of the third objective element resulted in additional division of 
two criteria within it, which include 1) level of contribution to the commission of 
crime100 and 2) contribution after the commission of crime.101 the Pre-trial Chamber I 
paid special attention to the fact that such contribution cannot be any and that it is 
necessary to prove its substantiality.102
the Chamber also emphasizes the intention of the rome statute drafters to 
establish rather serious threshold for charging individual criminal responsibility 
under Art. 25 in general.103 For instance, public knowledge about any activity does not 
satisfy the criteria necessary for charging criminal responsibility under Art. 25(3)(d).104 
Pro tanto, proving the existence namely of the substantial contribution is necessary 
for the abovementioned charging.105
In order to establish such contribution to the commission or attempted commission 
of the crime the Chamber may take into consideration several factors, such as 
1) knowledge about general aim of ‘the group of people acting with a common purpose;’ 
2) the tainted reputation due to the participation in this group’s criminal activity; 
3) efforts made to prevent the commission of crimes; 4) creation of the criminal plan; 
5) ‘the position of the suspect in the group;’ and 6) ‘the role the suspect played vis-à-vis 
the seriousness and scope of the crimes.’106 however, as the Pre-trial Chamber II stated 
in the decision of confirmation of charges in Ruto, the substantiality of the contribution 
first of all should ‘result in the commission of the international crimes charged.’107
In order to establish the contribution ex post facto of the commission of 
international crime it is necessary to prove the existence of an agreement between 
the suspect and the group of persons acting with a common purpose regarding 
such contribution before the commission of this crime.108
In its decision declining to confirm the charges in Mbarushimana the Pre-trial 
Chamber I also analyzed an issue of additional criteria for the subjective element 
for charging individual criminal responsibility under Art. 25(3)(d) and stated that 
subjective element in this regard shall include 1) an intent to ‘engage in the relevant 
conduct that allegedly contributes to the crime;’ 109 and 2) an intent of subsequent 
100 Mbarushimana, supra n. 89, ¶¶ 276–284.
101 Id. ¶¶ 286–287.
102  Id. ¶ 276.
103  Id. 
104  Id. ¶ 277.
105  Id. ¶ 284.
106  Id. 
107  ruto et al., supra n. 30, ¶ 354.
108  Mbarushimana, supra n. 89, ¶ 287.
109 Id. ¶ 288.
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realization of criminal aim of the group of persons acting with a common purpose 
or awareness of the group’s plan to commit a crime.110
the existence of intent shall be construed as simultaneous awareness of 
the suspect regarding his participation in conduct aimed at the commission of 
international crime and awareness of understanding his conduct as contribution 
to commission of crimes by the group of persons acting with a common purpose 
due to which he will be charged with individual criminal responsibility.111 In order 
to establish the second subjective element the suspect’s knowledge about his 
conduct as a contribution to the commission of crimes by the abovementioned 
group, purpose is sufficient.112
4. Katanga and Ngudjolo: A Trend for Changing Modes of Individual Criminal 
Responsibility?
on March 7, 2014, the trial Chamber II found Mr. katanga guilty under Article 
25(3)(d) as an accessory113 of the commission of crime against humanity in the form 
of murder and four counts of war crimes committed in democratic republic of the 
Congo.114 Previously the Prosecutor argued that both Mr. katanga and Mr. Ngudjolo 
should be subjected to individual criminal responsibility within the meaning 
of Art. 25(3)(a)115 as principals. however, the trial Chamber II in its Decision on the 
Implementation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and Severing the Charges 
against the Accused Persons changed the mode of individual criminal responsibility of 
Mr. katanga from Art. 25(3)(a) to Art. 25(3)(d) while the Court did not undertake the 
similar action towards Mr. Ngudjolo and further separated their cases.116
the Pre-trial Chamber II approved the legality of its abovementioned decision 
referring, inter alia, to the Lubanga case117 where the Appeal Chamber recognized 
110 Mbarushimana, supra n. 89, ¶ 289.
111  Id. ¶ 288.
112 Id. ¶ 289.
113  situation in democratic republic (Prosecutor v. germain katanga), <http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_
menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/
icc%200104%200107/Pages/democratic%20republic%20of%20the%20congo.aspx> (accessed 
Mar. 12, 2015).
114  Id.
115  katanga & Ngudjolo, supra n. 61, ¶ 540.
116  situation in the democratic republic of the Congo (the Prosecutor v. germain katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui), No. ICC-01/04-01/07 (Intl. Crim. Ct., tr. Chamber II, Nov. 21, 2012), available at <http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1529337.pdf> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015) [hereinafter katanga & 
Ngudjolo, tr. Chamber II].
117  Id. ¶ 12.
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the validity of regulation 55,118 having emphasized that ‘applicable human rights 
standards allow the modification of the legal characterization in the course of a trial, 
as long as this does not adversely affect the fairness of the trial.’119 this reference 
to the human rights standards is controversial. while the ICC is empowered to 
recharacterize the mode of responsibility, it did so after 288 days after the closure 
of representing the evidence and 182 days after closure of arguments.120 By virtue 
of this act the Court had deprived Mr. katanga from further possibility to present 
his defence in a better way, which was essential because of the complete change 
of grounds for accusation. such actions prima facie may be construed as violation 
of the procedural rights of the accused (or right for fair trial).
Apart from the human rights implications, the Pre-trial Chamber justified its decision 
of changing the mode of individual criminal responsibility of Mr. katanga by 1) resulting 
his contribution to the general criminal plan in the international crimes’ commission and 
2) the conformity of Mr. katanga’s behaviour with objective and subjective elements 
necessary for application of Art. 25(3)(d),121 drawing extreme attention that it ‘has not 
exceed the facts contained in the decision on the confirmation of charges’122 and that 
the changing of mode of individual criminal responsibility is ‘only a relatively limited 
step.’123 the Pre-trial Chamber also emphasized that its Majority intended to ‘restrict 
itself to the facts pertaining solely to Mr. katanga’124 and noted that
actus reus of participation in a crime within the meaning of Article 25(3)(d), 
especially the requirement of a significant and important contribution,125 
are in this case an integral part of the material elements characterizing 
the commission of the crime within the meaning of Article 25(3)(a), i.e. the 
requirement of an essential contribution resulting in the realization of the 
objective elements of the crimes.126
118  regulations of the Court, regulation 55(1), at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/Nr/rdonlyres/B920Ad62-
dF49-4010-8907-E0d8CC61EBA4/277527/regulations_of_the_Court_170604EN.pdf> (accessed 
Mar. 12, 2015), the text follows as:
‘1. In its decision under article 74, the Chamber may change the legal characterisation of facts to 
accord with the crimes under articles 6, 7 or 8, or to accord with the form of participation of the 
accused under articles 25 and 28, without exceeding the facts and circumstances described in the 
charges and any amendments to the charges.’
119  katanga & Ngudjolo, tr. Chamber II, supra n. 116, ¶ 12.
120  wyngaert, katanga, supra n. 38, ¶ 124.
121  katanga & Ngudjolo, tr. Chamber II, supra n. 116, ¶¶ 28, 30.
122  Id. ¶ 31.
123  Id.
124  Id. ¶ 32.
125  Id. ¶ 33.
126  Id.
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It also indicated that Mr. katanga’s knowledge regarding realization of the crimes, 
inter alia, during the attack on the Bogoro village, ‘allows the Majority to deduce 
that the subjective element considered under Article 25(3)(d) is consistent with the 
previously described facts and circumstances.’127
the change in the mode of responsibility has been apparently a hot issue 
before the panel. Judge Van den wyngaert in her dissenting opinion to the 
Katanga judgment strongly opposed to this Majority’s decision. she states that 
‘recharacterizarion of the charges in this case from Article 25(3)(a) to Article 25(3)(d) 
without fundamental change of “facts and circumstances” of the Confirmation 
decision’ is impossible and therefore violates Art. 74 of the rome statute.128
As a response, instead of being merely silent, the Majority reacted in an interesting 
way by presenting its Concurrent opinion. while the Concurrent opinion appears to 
be a rebuttal to what Judge Van den wyngaert had written, the Majority’s reasoning 
is rather poor and aims to negate all allegations by simply denying them. this might 
raise an issue of belief in their confidence in what has been decided.
returning to the essence of the trial Chamber II’s Judgment pursuant to Art. 74 of the 
rome statute in the case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga it is worth mentioning that 
this Chamber accepted and agreed with the logic of the Pre-trial Chamber II regarding 
changing the mode of individual criminal responsibility of Mr. katanga. the trial Chamber 
examined objective and subjective elements necessary for application of Art. 25(3)(d) and 
came to the conclusion that all of them were confirmed.129 having analyzed all the facts, 
circumstances and evidence provided by the Parties the trial Chamber II stated that ‘the 
activity engaged in by Mr. katanga . . . had a significant effect or impact on the commission 
of the crimes within the meaning of Article 25(3)(d).’130 the Chamber paid special attention 
to the issue of the contribution of Mr. katanga to the commission of crimes and came to 
the conclusion that facts and circumstances prove its significance.131
the opposite situation happened with Mr. Ngudjolo Chui. After separation of 
The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui case and changing 
the mode of individual criminal responsibility of Mr. katanga, the trial Chamber II in 
its Judgment pursuant to Art. 74 of the rome statute in the case of The Prosecutor v. 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui acquitted Mr. Ngudjolo of his previous charges and ordered 
his immediate release.132 the main argumentation of the Chamber in this regard 
127  katanga & Ngudjolo, tr. Chamber II, supra n. 116, ¶ 33.
128  wyngaert, katanga, supra n. 38, ¶ 32; katanga, summary, supra n. 41, ¶ 55.
129  katanga, summary, supra n. 41, ¶ 73.
130  Id. ¶ 77.
131 Id. ¶¶ 82, 84.
132  situation in democratic republic of the Congo (Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui), <http://
www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/
related%20cases/ICC-01-04-02-12/Pages/default.aspx> (accessed Mar. 12, 2015).
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may be summarized as its inability to establish beyond the reasonable doubt facts 
necessary for bringing to individual criminal responsibility under Art. 25 lato sensu 
and insufficiency of the received evidence.133
therefore last events of ICC practice seem to be rather controversial. on the one 
hand it remains evident that ICC supports the trend of acquitting individuals where 
there is insufficient evidence like in the Mbarushimana case. on the other hand the 
Katanga case may become a new trend in ICC practice due to additional practical 
recognition of the legality of regulation 55 and further ability to change a previously 
declared mode of individual criminal responsibility.
In our opinion, the contradictory decisions concerning Mr. katanga and Mr. 
Ngudjolo, whose cases were originally joined but later divided, may in the future 
lead to legal uncertainty. the Pre-trial Chamber II and the trial Chamber II have 
analyzed the same situation, the same plan, the same events and yet they have 
come to different conclusions. Indeed, Mr. katanga has to consider the outcome of 
his case unfair in comparison to the Ngudjolo’s one.
In this regard aligning with the principle of legal certainty seems to be the best 
solution for preventing such controversies in further ICC practice. however, its 
application by ICC is still to be fully introduced to the full extent. For instance, Judges 
Fatoumata diarra and Bruno Cotte in their concurring opinion to the Katanga case 
clearly indicated the importance of possible implications imposed by the principle 
of legality by saying ‘[w]e understand the principle of legality as well as that of fair 
and impartial proceedings, which have informed our approach throughout this 
case.’134 yet those implications are quite unclear since no explanations follow that 
sentence.
however, even without taking into account the abovementioned ambiguity, the 
international criminal law is initially apparently not the most suitable branch for this 
principle up to date, as the former Associate Legal officer at the ICty s. dana indicated: 
‘[I]n the context of prosecuting . . . genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, 
international criminal law appears to be resigned to such a principle . . .’135 the starting 
point for this perception has undoubtedly been the Nuremberg process where the 
main argument of the defence was referring to the lack of legal rule prohibiting the 
acts under consideration at the time of their conducting.
133  Ngudjolo, supra n. 40, ¶¶ 404, 503, 516.
134  situation in the democratic republic of the Congo (Prosecutor v. germain katanga) ¶ 3, No. ICC-01/04-
01/07 (Intl. Crim. Ct., tr. Chamber II, Mar. 7, 2014) (concurring opinion of Judges Fatoumata diarra 
and Bruno Cotte), available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1748105.pdf> (accessed 
Mar. 12, 2015).
135  shahram dana, Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice: A Theory on the Principle of Legality in 
International Criminal Law Sentencing, 99(4) J. Crim. L. & Criminology 858 (2009), available at <http://
scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7335&context=jclc> (accessed 
Mar. 12, 2015).
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Nevertheless, the ICC should stick to this principle to avoid further unfairness. 
otherwise, not only will the Court give its opponents more grounds for rational 
criticism and therefore undermine the whole system of international criminal justice 
but also sow the seeds for personal tragedy of innocent convicted by the ICC.
5. Conclusions
Individual criminal responsibility originated as a response to modern challenges 
of necessity to hold selected persons liable for war atrocities and crimes against 
humanity. development of this concept has led to the adoption of the rome statute 
in 1998 containing Art. 25 devoted to the forms of individual criminal responsibility. 
In this regard, Art. 25 is fairly the most exhaustive list of such forms, compared with 
its predecessors: international military tribunals and ad hoc tribunals.
In spite of this, already the first judgment of the Court has shown that the concept 
of individual criminal responsibility is far from complete. Judge Fulford in his separate 
opinion addressed the contentious aspects concerning not only detailed issues like 
the necessity for a doctrine determining the level of perpetrator’s participation, 
but also such general matters as whether Art. 25(3) contains in itself a hierarchy 
of individual criminal responsibility forms. while it is doubtful if Fulford will have 
an opportunity to convince the Chambers to apply his arguments later, since he 
is already a resigned judge, no doubt exists that the concept at stake will only be 
developed through the subsequent practice of the ICC. Nevertheless he has a worthy 
and vigorous successor in Judge Van den wyngaert. Later, she consistently criticizes 
chiefly the control over a crime doctrine and its application by the ICC which was 
reflected in her solid dissenting opinions to Ngudjolo and Katanga.
these cases represent an interesting instance of potential application of the 
legality principle. whereas they both concerned the situation at the Bogoro village, 
the Court divided the cases and later changed the mode of responsibility for Mr. 
katanga, which did not happen with acquitted Mr. Ngudjolo. the recharacterization 
of accused’s actions is not contentious per se. this occurred after the closure of 
pleadings leaving Mr. katanga without any opportunity not only merely to think 
over the new strategy of defence but also to act accordingly. this fact raises serious 
concerns in respect of human rights and the legality principle. whether there has 
been indeed violation of those principles, it is difficult to say. In any case, the Court 
should be more careful in its decisions, as what can seem just a single mistake of 
system of justice is always a personal tragedy. Although the rome statute aims to 
put an end to impunity of those guilty for grave crimes, this principle does not imply 
the need to have as many accusatory judgments as possible.
Apart from these implications, the current practice brought to light also a strong 
critic towards the control over a crime doctrine applied by the Majority in the Lubanga, 
Ngudjolo and Katanga cases. As Judges Fulford and Van den wyngaert, inter alia, 
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argue, it is questionable whether this doctrine may be applicable due to the issue 
of blameworthiness. the doctrine under consideration was specifically designed for 
the german legal system where the necessity to understand who is a principal or an 
accessory was caused by different sentencing of them, while the rome statute does 
not explicitly require the same. this issue however might be avoided by interpreting 
the rome statute in such way as implicitly requiring assessing each situation on 
the case by case basis and therefore causing differentiation in the sentencing in 
any way.
As seen, the current ICC case law shows a lack of clear understanding of some 
concepts under Art. 25(3). the same can be said regarding other forms of liability, 
especially those that have not been applied by the ICC yet. however, given the cost 
of the necessity to apply the rome statute means to humanity, it would be better 
to preserve the status quo of its unapplied provisions.
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